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ABSTRACT

TWO ESSAYS ON THE EFFECTS OF CEO SOCIAL ACTIVISM

Habib Islam
Old Dominion University, 2022
Director: William Q. Judge

The first essay theorizes and quantifies the effects of CEO activism on firms’
financial performance. We examine this relationship within the framework of screening
theory. We find that CEO social activism generally leads to adverse investor reactions.
This negative effect is most prominent when there is interdimensional incongruence in
CEO social activism messages. In addition, we find that the negative effect of CEO social
activism is moderated by organizational characteristics that resolve incongruence caused
by disparate signals.
The second essay seeks to understand how a CEO’s social activism influences
corporate social performance. We hypothesize that CEO social activism will have a
negative influence on a wide variety of firm-level social performance indicators due to
previous theory and research which finds that firms have self-serving intentions behind
corporate social responsibility. Consistent with our prediction, we find that CEO social
activism negatively influences the firms’ social performance with respect to human
rights. We also find partial support for a negative relationship between CEO social
activism and the firms’ subsequent social performance regarding the natural environment.
Contrary to our theoretical prediction, we find that CEO social activism positively
influences firms’ social performance with respect to the community dimension; and we
find no relationship between social performance related to employee well-being. These
findings suggest that by and large, CEO social activism has negligible or negative
influences on various aspects of the firm’s social performance, with the possible
exception of social activism within the firm’s local communities. We also find that CEO
power sometimes accentuates these relationships.
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CHAPTER 1
ALL IS NOT AS IT SEEMS: THE EFFECTS OF CEO SOCIAL ACTIVISM ON FIRMS’
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

ABSTRACT
This research theorizes and quantifies the effects of CEO activism on firms’ financial
performance. We examine this relationship within the framework of screening theory. We find
that CEO social activism generally leads to adverse investor reactions. This negative effect is
most prominent when there is interdimensional incongruence in CEO social activism messages.
In addition, we find that the negative effect of CEO social activism is moderated by
organizational characteristics that resolve incongruence caused by disparate signals.

Keywords: CEO Social Activism, Stakeholders, Screening theory
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1. INTRODUCTION

It is well documented in the literature that firms may follow non-market strategies to
influence rules of the marketplace by inhibiting or promoting government policies regarding
human resources, taxation, trade, subsidies, and environmental issues, among others (Baron,
1995; Bonardi, Holburn, & Vanden Bergh, 2006). In practice, there are numerous examples of
CEOs employing such strategies. For example, Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella lobbied Congress
to allow high-skilled workers to immigrate to the United States. Since Microsoft relies on such
high-skilled labor for its competitive edge (Romm, 2014), this was a move that would clearly
benefit the company and its investors. Jeffry Immelt, former CEO of General Electric, advocated
for adoption of clean energy policies and regulations (Behr, 2010). Yet, GE’s large wind
turbine business would also likely benefit from this socially responsible advocacy. These nonmarket strategies, arguably constitute a win-win for both the firm whose CEO is advocating such
change and for the larger social cause (e.g. improved environmental sustainability, immigration
quality).
However, there are instances when firms’ CEOs take public positions on socio-political
issues that have broader societal effects and are not directly related to the firm's short-term
economic wellbeing. These personal and public attempts by CEOs to influence public opinion
actions on socio-political issues that may or may not directly impact firm operations, is referred
to as CEO activism (Hambrick & Wowak, 2019). For instance, the CEO of Ben & Jerry’s CEO
Matthew McCarthy said “Business should be held accountable to setting very specific targets,
specifically around dismantling white supremacy in and through our organizations… You
treasure what you measure. You measure what you treasure. If you don’t put goals around these
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things, they simply don’t happen.” (Forbes, 2016). This type of activism espouses to sway public
opinion in a particular direction. Formally, CEO social-political activism as “a business leader’s
personal and public expression of a stance on some matter of current social or political debate,
with the primary aims of visibly weighing in on the issue and influencing opinions in the
espoused direction” (Hambrick & Wowak, 2019; p:4). However, we refine this construct even
further in this paper. We decide to only focus on CEO social activism since prior literature has
focused on political activism in the form of political donations (e.g., Gupta, Briscoe, and
Hambrick, 2017).
A CEO’s social activism can represent his or hers public position regarding an issue that
directly affects their firm’s bottom line, as when a gun manufacturer’s CEO speaks out about
second amendment rights. Or it may be associated with issues that have more distal impact, as
when the CEO of an aerospace firm speaks of his or support for the Black Lives Matter
movement. Scholars have identified three key characteristics of CEO social activism (Chatterji
& Toffel, 2019; Hambrick & Wowak, 2019). First, CEO social activism may (or may not) align
with the firm’s culture and values, as well as with its tangible policies, such as corporate social
responsibility, but it is theoretically separate from them. Second, CEO social activism is always
communicated in a public forum, separate from the private corporation. Third, the CEO’s social
activism audience is investors, employees, consumers, competitors, and the broader public, as
opposed to just regulators and politicians, as is the case in non-market strategy (e.g., Chatterji &
Toffel, 2019). As such, CEO social activism is a mechanism by which a CEO communicates
their personal values to all of the firm’s stakeholders, as opposed to trying to influence regulation
to have a direct impact on the firm’s short-term economic prospects. Therefore, the CEO might
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use a public forum such as social media, editorials, and television interviews to make her opinion
known (Chatterji & Toffel, 2015).
Critiques of the practice of CEO social activism suggest that if activities that CEOs take
part in do not align closely to that of the core elements of the business, they can hurt the firm’s
social standing in society (Lantos, 2001; McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006; Porter & Kramer,
2006) and may hurt economic outcomes (Bhagwat, Warren, Beck, & Watson, 2020).
Additionally, critics suggest that CEO social activism may be interpreted as a disguised attempt
to enhance brand loyalty and attract new customers as opposed to a genuine effort to raise
awareness of social issues that are aligned with the values of the CEO and the corporation that he
or she represents (e.g., Hess & Warren, 2008; Karnani, 2010; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011).
Despite these cautionary issues, CEOs often take the opportunity to speak as individuals
and influence social issues that are consistent with their personal values. Prominent CEOs such
as Tim Cook, Sundar Pichai, Satya Nadella, Mary Barra, and Marc Benioff have consistently
spoken in public social media forums, such as Twitter, on issues that are not directly related to
the bottom line of the firm and are related to issues that hold personal value to them. For
instance, Marry Barra, the CEO of GM (the third-largest motor-vehicle manufacturer in the
world), tweeted on Feb 20, 2020, “My message for all young women today for
#IntroduceAGirlToEngineeringDay: you can be and do anything!” We view these types of
statements as CEO social activism, where CEOs, such as Barra, use their massive social media
following and prestige power to communicate a personal value—in Barra’s case, the importance
of engineering education for women’s empowerment.
Despite increasing incidences of CEO social activism, few studies have systematically
and empirically examined the effects of CEO social activism on firm outcomes. In an important
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first study, Chatterjee and Toffel (2019) found that CEO social activism raises public awareness
surrounding a particular social issue, but not more so than other sources do, such as newspapers’
opinion pieces or cable news opinion discussions, that also try to influence public awareness. In
addition, they show that the framing of issues is an important determinant of how such issues are
perceived by the public. Finally, they found that CEO social activism is positively related to the
purchase intention of customers who hold a similar view to the CEO. As such, CEO social
activism serves as a signal to show where the CEO’s opinion is situation in contentious social
issues (Chatterji & Toffel, 2019). Regarding CEO activism’s effect on firm economic value,
evidence is less than conclusive. Mkrtchyan et al., (2021) found that CEO social activism is
positively related to firm value. However, Bhagwat et al.,(2020) found that socio-political
activism might have a negative impact on firm value if socio-political activism deviates from key
stakeholder values.
Despite these important studies, it is clear that the impact of CEO social activism on firm
value is more nuanced. An important determinant of a firm’s long-term success is investors’
perception regarding CEOs’ ability to lead the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The corporate
finance literature suggests that CEO reputation matters regarding long-term shareholder value,
earning quality, and capital investment (e.g., Millbourn, 2003; Gaines-Ross, 2000; Jian & Lee
2011), and it is possible that individual activism efforts influence the value of the firm. Screening
theory provides insight into how investors might screen signals embedded in CEO social
activism. Screening theory suggests that at the crux of evaluation of a signal is the resolution of
interdimensional incongruence- the idea that if a signal contains multiple dimensions, screeners
use available information to resolve incongruence created by these multiple dimensions. Based
on this mechanism, we hypothesize and find that if CEO social activism contains multiple
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dimensions, investors appraise these signals negatively. We also find that contextual factors that
allow for additional information-firm size and information dilution-firm diversification affect
this relationship
Our research makes make several contributions. First, we advance the non-market
strategy literature by introducing CEO social activism as a strategic option with implications for
stakeholder relationships. We also provide a theoretical framework to understand how this nonmarket strategy is interpreted by the primary stakeholders of the firm (i.e., Shareholders).
Second, we contribute to the literature focused on signal incongruence (e.g., Paruchuri et
al., 2021; Drover et al., 2018; Vergne et al., 2018) by showcasing how interdimensional
incongruence can be embedded in social activism messages and how screeners (e.g., investors)
may resolve interdimensional incongruence not only by evaluating the content of the message
but also by taking into account relevant information available about the firm.
Third, we contribute to the emergent literature in CEO socio activism. CEO political
ideology has been linked to a firm’s risk-taking (Christensen et al., 2015) and corporate social
responsibility (Chin et al., 2013). A related but distinct construct of corporate political activism
has been associated with a firm value (Bhagwat et al.,2020) and corporate social responsibility
(Gupta et al., 2017). In this paper, we show that CEO social activism, a contract distinct from
firm sociopolitical activism, affects shareholders' valuation of the firm.

2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Signaling and Screening Processes and CSA
According to signaling theory, organizations (transmitters of signals) convey pertinent
information to their receivers through signals in order to help reduce information asymmetry and
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better inform receivers’ behavior (Spence 1974). Screening theory builds upon signaling theory
and addresses what receivers do once they obtain a signal, including how they search for and
evaluate cues to interpret it more accurately (Connelly et al., 2011). Society has become more
concerned about CEOs’ sociopolitical values (Adelman 2018), yet firms often hide these values
(Gaines-Ross 2017), which gives rise to information asymmetry. CEOs may engage in social
activism for a variety of reasons such as being motivated by morality, business interests, or a
combination of morality and economic self-interest (e.g., talent recruitment). We posit that even
if a CEO expresses a partisan sociopolitical position to help meet certain firm objectives, it
qualifies as social activism because it bears the risks that such views would create a backlash
from opposing stakeholders.
Whatever a CEO’s underlying motivation may be, commitment to social activism signals
the CEO’s sociopolitical values. There signals reduce information asymmetry between the firm
and its stakeholders by educating the stakeholders of the sociopolitical values held by the firm’s
CEO. Stakeholders will then perform additional evaluations of the firm’s position regarding the
focus of the activism to help close the gap between what they know about the firm and the
desired information they need about the firm (Miller & Triana 2009). While customers,
employees, legislators and government regulators want to know how the CEOs' values compare
to their own values, investors will evaluate the signal in order to predict its anticipated effect on
shareholder wealth and firms’ future cash flows (Sanders and Boivie 2004; Saboo and Grewal
2013). Our focus in this study is on investors' responses to CEO social activism.
When evaluating a signal, investors look for observable cues that notify them about (1)
what outcome they can expect as a result of the signal and (2) unobservable characteristics of the
firm (Bergh et al., 2014). We organize our theoretical framework accordingly. First, we clarify
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the overall effect of CSA. We then hypothesize predictions based on two key mechanisms in
screening theory: (1) incongruency of signals and (2) firm characteristics that resolve investor’s
anxiety caused by CSA.
2.2. Investors’ Response to CSA
Investors consider that managers have a fiduciary responsibility to uphold shareholder
interests that will lead to enhanced profits (Mishra & Modi 2016). From the perspective of the
investors, CSA is fundamentally risky, can endanger future cash flows, and redirects the
organizational efforts from conventional shareholder value maximization endeavors. This is due
to CSA’s partisan nature. In particular, while CSA may be appealing to some stakeholders who
agree with the stance that the CEO has taken, it may inexorably offend other stakeholders who
hold dissenting values (Kotler & Sarkar 2017). Therefore, the polarizing nature of CSA may
raise the dispersion of the evaluations of a company’s brands, and previous studies have linked
dispersion to lower abnormal stock returns (Luo, Raithel, & Wiles 2013). In addition, it is
difficult to calculate the enormity of the unfavorable responses to CSA and whether the positive
reactions will lead to quantifiable benefits, such as an increase in revenue.
Investors may also consider that the more attention, resources, and time CEOs allocate to
CSA, the less likely they are to dedicate time towards innovation, operation, and other critical
profit-generating activities (Nalick et al., 2016). This worry could persevere even when CSA
conveys a business interest or is aligned with some groups of stakeholders (e.g., customers &
employees), since it can still offend a large segment of the population, which generates more
uncertainty and necessitates firms to allocate more of their resources and efforts to managing any
backlash. Additionally, engagement in CSA may signal a fundamental shift in the firm’s
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strategic posture, suggesting unpredictable and long-lasting changes in strategic commitments
(Ghemawat 1991). Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1: Investors react negatively to CEOs’ engagement in social activism.

2.3. Information Incongruity in CSA
When evaluating sets of signals, consistency across signals of a given set is the key to the
usefulness of the signals (Connelly et al., 2011). While congruent signals magnify the impact of
one another because they mutually confirm the signaled content (Plummer et al., 2016; Stern et
al., 2014), incongruent signals create uncertainty (Zhao & Zhou, 2011). For instance, when a
graduate program applicant submits a high GMAT score and a poorly written essay, assessors
find it hard to assess the applicant’s academic writing ability. In the same vein, a wine with a
Napa Valley appellation (a high-standard designation) but that has been ranked poorly by the
critics conveys a confusing image that curbs the winery from charging a premium (Zhao & Zhou,
2011)
When CSA contains multiple categories (e.g., community, environment, human rights,
and employee), it may create interdimensional incongruence. When interdimensional
incongruence is high due to having multiple categories, investor reactions are shaped, in addition
to the negative reaction to CSA itself, by resolution of this interdimensional incongruence
(Connelly et al., 2011). Essentially, investors resolve the interdimensional incongruence by
extending their negative reactions to the CSA to incongruity in the announcement that is
cognitively available and relevant to the firm evaluation process (Bonardi & Keim, 2005;
Pollock et al. 2008). Thus, investors have additional negative reactions to the extent to which
those CSA are salient. For instance, Paruchuri et al. (2021) found that silence of incongruent
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signals increased investors' negative reaction to accounting restatements. Therefore, we
hypothesize,
H2: Investors’ negative reaction to CEOs’ engagement in social activism is
amplified when that social activism contains multiple dimensions.
2.4. Firm Characteristics that Resolve Investors’ Anxiety Related to CSA
Firm size . Larger firms’ visibility makes them particularly prone to maintaining
legitimacy (Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995). They attract greater media attention
because they have greater visibility in their locality (Ingram & Simons, 1995), and these firms
are typically held to a higher standard than their smaller counterparts (Goodstein, 1994). Large
firms actively provide information to external stakeholders, typically through well-defined and
codified routines and procedures executed by investor relations departments (Carter, 2006; Rao
& Sivakumar, 1999), and additional stakeholders such as the media and analysts provide
significantly more coverage of large firms (Bhushan, 1989).
In contrast, information about small firms is often scarce and costly to obtain (Hong,
Lim, & Stein, 2000). Consequently, researchers have found that investors react more positively
to alliance announcements from small firms than from large firms (Das et al., 1988; Koh &
Venkataraman, 1991; McConnell & Nantell, 1985), reflecting higher salience of such
announcements from small firms. Thus, when CSA occurs, that signal will be more salient for
smaller firms than for more prominent firms. Because CEOs set the tone at the top and it is hard
for investors to find information elsewhere for smaller firms, CSA for smaller firms will send a
more salient negative message. Therefore, we hypothesize,
H3: Investors' negative reaction to CEOs’ engagement in CSA is amplified for
smaller firms.
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Firm Diversification. A firm that is more diversified serves more market segments
compared to a firm that is less diversified (Palepu, 1985; Teece, 1982). The literature in strategy
suggests that by diversifying into new business segments, organizations can benefit from
economies of scope. (Teece, 1982). increased market power and competitive advantage
(Markides & Williamson, 1994), higher debt capacity (Llewellyn, 1971), and more efficient
internal capital markets (Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000). However, despite these potential
advantages of corporate diversification, evidence suggests that diversification diminishes
shareholder wealth (see Barnes & Hardie-Brown, 2006; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lins & Servaes,
1999).
Strategy literature suggests a positive relationships between corporate diversification and
information asymmetries which might exacerbate outside investors' effort to assess the value of
diversified firms appropriately. Extant literature shows that there is a positive relationship
between corporate diversification and information asymmetries (see Duru & Reeb, 2002;
Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999; Nanda & Narayana, 1999). This line of inquiry points to
the ‘transparency hypothesis’ (Hadlock, Ryngaert & Thomas, 2001), which posits that, while
firms’ managers have access to disaggregated information about the present and future cash
flows and growth estimates of individual segments of the diversified organization, investors
receive consolidated information that makes it difficult for them to assess the value of such
Diversification (Thomas, 2002). In addition, the interactions between different business
segments, which are constituted out of different cognitive assets, make diversified organizations
more complicated and difficult for outsiders to assess (Akoi, 2010).
Diversification affects the degree to which CSA may affect a firm’s value proposition at
the corporate level (Carter, 2006; Connelly et al., 2011). This occurs because the signals from
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diversified firms are often distorted and have limited signaling value due to the complexity of
operations (Carter, 2006; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Therefore, for investors, CSA signals
might be challenging to assess for highly diversified firms. For instance, a diversified firm might
operate a water treatment facility that produces clean water for a community, while that same
firm might have a facility that produces chemicals for irrigation purposes. As such, the CEO of
such a firm might have to speak out on a broad spectrum of issues, including environmental
degradation due to fertilizer misuse to community wellbeing due to clean water supply. Because
of these reasons’ investors have a hard time assessing CSA for a diversified firm. Therefore, we
hypothesize,
H4: Investors' negative reaction to CEOs’ engagement in CSA is reduced for
highly diversified firms.

3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Data and Sample
Our sample frame consists of all CEOs of publicly traded firms in the USA, which includes firms
in the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. We track the CEOs of publicly traded firms
who are active on Twitter between the years 2007 to 2020, from which we collect CEO social
activism data, as Twitter is a public forum where CEOs can express their values and opinions.
Twitter is ranked as the fourth most-visited website in the world, with over 300 million active
users (Similarweb, 2020), and is widely regarded as one of the most influential social media
platforms. We follow several steps to collect our data. First, the online platform CrunchBase
tracks the social media presence of the CEOs of publicly traded firms. We matched CrunchBase
with the ExecuComp database on CEOs’ first and last names and their company name. This
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allowed collection of both CEO Twitter handles and their firm-specific information. Our initial
sample contained 253 CEOs. Then we manually checked whether the Twitter account belongs to
the CEO or whether it is a company account where the CEO is sometimes mentioned. This
dropped the number to 153 Twitter accounts, which belong to the CEO personally, After we
established that the 153 CEO accounts are trackable, we used Twitter’s API (Application
Programming Interface), which is available to developers and researchers, and wrote a scraper
program using R programming language’s TwitterR library to collect all of the tweets written by
these 153 CEOs over the period of January 2007, when Twitter came into existence, to
November 2020.
Our initial data contained 330,000 tweets. However, many of these tweets were solely
about firms’ strategy, profitability, organizational structure, and performance and did not relate
to CEO social activism. Hence, we created a filter using R’s built-in machine learning tool,
“topicmodels”, that uses an LDA algorithm, and scanned the data about strategy, profitability,
organizational structure, and performance-related words among these tweets and discarded the
tweets that mentioned those words. After discarding those tweets, our sample contained 175,000
tweets from 135 CEOs. We then merged the data with CRSP daily stock price data using the
tweet date and the firm’s Ticker symbol. Finally, we merged this dataset with the segments
database collected from COMPUSTAT. Our final sample contained 21,913 tweet events for 138
firms over the period of 2007-2020. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the data.
***************Insert table 1 here*********************
3.2. Variables and Measures
3.2. 1. Dependent Variable: The dependent variable in our analysis is the cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) to a company’s stock price. Because we are interested in investors’ reactions to a
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particular tweet, we control for the market-wide fluctuations in stock price returns in addition to
the correlation between the incumbent firm’s returns and the market return. Market fluctuations
could occur for a number of exogenous reasons, none of which have to do with the CEO's social
activism using Twitter. Similarly, some stocks are more prone than others to vary in conjunction
with the market. CAR is a standard measure of stock price return in event studies (Patel, 1976;
Brown and Warner, 1985; Chatterjee, 1992; Gaver, Gaver, and Battistel, 1992; Zajac and
Westphal, 2004) which allowed us to estimate fluctuation in the stock price as it differs from the
expected return based exogenous fluctuation of the market. I obtain data on daily stock price
returns from the CRSP database.
We estimate CAR in three steps. First, I estimate the daily abnormal return for an
individual stock. The daily abnormal return for a firm, j, is described as
abnormal returnjt =Rjt – ajt – bj Rmt
where Rjt is the rate of return for a day around a personal activism tweet, and ajt and bj are
regression coefficients taken from the following expected return equation:
Rjt = alphaj + betajRmt + εjt
where Rjt is the rate of return for firm j for a period of days preceding the tweet, Rmt is the market
return (the equally weighted daily return for all firms in the CRSP index) on day t, betaj is the
systematic risk of firm j, alphaj is the rate of return on firm j when Rmt is zero, and εjt is a serially
independent disturbance term with E(εjt) = 0. Rjt can be interpreted as the expected return for the
stock of firm j holding constant shifts in the overall market portfolio. The regression coefficients
for expected return were calculated for a 239-day period prior to the beginning of the event
window. A 239-day prior period is often used in event study analyses (e.g., Zajac & Westphal,
2004). Thus, the daily abnormal return tells us the difference between the actual daily stock price
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return and the expected return, which is based on a firm’s stock price correlation with the CRSP
equally weighted market index. A positive abnormal return indicates that a firm’s return was
greater than would be expected based on recent past performance. A negative abnormal return
tells us that the stock price is declining compared with what we should expect.
Following a commonly accepted procedure, we calculate CAR as the sum of all of the
daily abnormal returns for a 3-day period around the tweet event for each focal firm. Included in
the CAR window are the one day prior to the activism tweet (day -1) and the one day following
the tweet event (day +1). For ease of interpretation we standardized this variable.
3.2.2. Independent and Moderator Variables: To measure the CEO’s social activism event, we
conduct a text analysis on the tweets. We use the text analysis software CAT scanner (McKenny
& Short, 2012), and the dictionary established by Pencle and Malaescu (2016). The analysis
generates a set of word counts for words such as “Discriminatory,” “Bio Diversities,”
“Medicaid,” and “white privileges”. Pencle and Malaescu (2016) provide a dictionary for CEO
Social Activism along four dimensions — human rights, social and community, environment,
and employee. We code a tweet as an activism event if any of these four dimensions are present
in the tweet.
CSA dimensions were coded on a scale of 1-4, representing whether only one dimension
or all four dimensions of CSA were present in the tweet. If all four dimensions are present, a
tweet represents the highest incongruence, and if only one dimension is present, a tweet
represents the lowest incongruence.
We operationalized Firm size was as the log-transformed total revenue of the firm as
reported in the quarter before the tweet event (e.g., Gomulya & Mishina, 2017). Following prior
research, we log-transformed the variable to correct the skewness of the distribution (Collins &
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Clark, 2003; Kimberly, 1976). We collected this information from the quarterly financial data of
the Compustat database.
We measured the level of a Firm’s Diversification by Diversification was measured
using Palepu’s (1985) entropy measure for total diversification. This information was collected
from the Compustat Segment database. Entropy is calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index.
Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of squares of sales in each segment divided by the
square of the firm’s total sales. This implies that a greater score for entropy indicates a higher
level of diversification.
3.2.3. Control Variables: A set of control variables that are standard in event study models (e.g.,
Westphal & Zajac, 2004) were introduced in the analysis. We controlled for Firm, CEO, and
Industry characteristics that could impact the market’s reaction activism tweets. The firm
characteristics variable is past performance (Zajac & Westphal, 2004) which has consistently
been shown to affect the market reaction. We also controlled for CEO ownership, which is
calculated using the percent of the firm’s stocks owned by the CEO. CEO ownership is
associated with firms' value as measured by tobin’1 q (Griffith, 1999), abnormal returns,
especially among firms with weak external governance (Lilienfeld-Toal & Ruenzi, 2014).
Finally, we included dummy variables for year and industry (using primary two-digit SIC
codes of adopting firms) (coefficients for these dummy variables are not reported and are
available from the authors)
***************Insert table 2 here*********************

3.3. Data Analysis and Results
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Hypotheses were tested using an event study methodology. Event studies in financial
economics literature regularly examine the impact of treatment variables on excess returns with
the use of subgroup analyses. Scholars have also advocated the use of multiple regression
analysis to control for possible exogenous variables (e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Because
the data set comprises excess returns from different time intervals, there could be autocorrelation
in the data (cf., Binder 1998). Following Zajac and Westphal (2004), we test my hypotheses
within a linear probability framework (OLS) and use the Cochrane Orcutt transformation to
adjust for first-order autocorrelation.
To account for potential endogeneity caused by the selection bias from the non-twitter
CEOs , we follow Lall, Chen, and Roberts (2020) by estimating a selection function from the full
sample and include a Inverse Mill's Ratio in estimation models.
In addition to the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation, we address the possibility of timevarying correlation in two ways: (a) in a different model, we control for higher-order
autocorrelation and the results remain unchanged, and (2) we also account for time effects by
entering robust standard errors clustered by year, and we find that the results were unchanged. In
addition, to ensure that the results are not susceptible to our research design, we performed two
sets of additional analyses. First, we executed my analyses with several implementation
windows, which included time frames of (1) one year and (2) six months (e.g. Zajac & Westphal,
2004), and the results are consistent with what we report below. Table 2 presents results that test
Hypotheses 1-4. Model 1 includes control variables. The results are consistent with past research.
Past performance is positively related to CAR, and CEO ownership is negatively related to CAR,
supporting the entrenchment argument.
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Hypothesis 1 suggests a negative relationship between CEO activism and investor
reaction. We find support for this in the full model (beta= -0.0629; p<0.05). Hypothesis 2 asserts
that interdimensional incongruence due to multiple dimensions with a single tweet would
exacerbate the negative reaction of the CEO. We find support for this hypothesis in the partial
model (beta= -0.0357; p<0.001) but in the full model. We also find support for the first
moderating effect (Hypothesis 3) which suggests that as firm size increases, the negative effect
of activism events would diminish (beta= 0.0101; p<0.05). The moderating effect (Hypothesis 4)
of Diversification was not supported.
***************Insert figure 1a & 1b about here*********************
To test the economic significance of our analyses, we proceeded with a marginal effects
analysis. Figure 1a and 1b shows the predictive margins of both the moderating variables. It is
evident from figure 1a as firm size increases, the negative effect of CSA decreases highlighted
by the less steep slope of the larger firms compared to the much greater slope steepness of the
smaller firms. Figure 1b also shows regardless of the levels of diversification, the effect of CSA
remains unchanged, as evident by the parallel slopes of firms with varying degrees of
diversification.

4. DISCUSSION
Our aim has been to explicate the theoretical and empirical consequences of CEO social
activism (CSA), a somewhat unexplored but extremely important managerial behavior.
Screening theory suggests that investors react negatively to signals that do not directly convey
information regarding the enhancement of their wealth. Screening theory also suggests that at the
core of evaluation of any signal is the resolution of interdimensional incongruence- the assertion
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that signals contain multiple dimensions and screeners use the information available to them to
resolve incongruence caused by these multiple dimensions. Based on these mechanisms, we find
overall support for the theory. More specifically, we find that CSA has a negative effect on
shareholders’ reactions, and if CSA contains multiple dimensions, investors appraise these
signals more negatively. We also find that for larger firms, this negative effect goes away
because investors have many lines of information to assess firms’ efforts to increase shareholder
value. Therefore, the differential effect of CSA does not make a significant impact on investors’
assessment of firm value.
4.1. Theoretical Implications
We make several contributions. We expand the non-market strategy literature by
showcasing CEO social activism as a strategic option with implications for stakeholder
relationships. We also provide a theoretical framework to understand how this non-market
strategy is interpreted by the primary stakeholders of the firm (i.e., Shareholders). Specifically,
we argue that CEO social activism will be negatively affect investors’ reaction because as
primary stakeholders they do not see the CEO social activism directly affecting their wealth.
Shareholders would postulate CEO energy is better spent in value creating activities of the firm
as oppose worrying about social causes that are tangentially or unrelated to wealth generation.
We also argue that shareholders’ negative reactions to CEO social activism are amplified in
cases where there is interdimensional incongruence- i.e., the activism message contains disparate
dimensions. Our argument is based on screening theory which suggests suggests that screeners
tend to negatively appraise messages that contain multiple disparate dimensions because such
messages are difficult to interpret and evaluate. Finally, we argue that firm characteristics that
alleviate information disparity or make it difficult to assess firm specific information for the
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screener would positively moderate the negative relationship between CEO activism and
shareholders negative reaction to such activism.
We find overall support for out theory. We find that CEO social activism is negatively
related to shareholders reaction measured over a there day CAR window. We also find that if
CEO social activism contain multiple dimensions this negative effect is magnified. Finally, we
find that for large firms, who has well established channels of communication with the
shareholders, CEO social activism is viewed positively by the shareholders supporting our
moderating hypothesis. For diversified firms the effect is positive but not significant.
Our insights contribute to the literature in signal incongruence (e.g., Paruchuri et al., 202;
Drover et al., 2018; Vergne et al., 2018) by showcasing how interdimensional incongruence can
be embedded in social activism messages and how screeners (e.g., investors) may resolve
interdimensional incongruence not only by evaluating the content of the message but also by
taking into account relevant information available about the firm.
Our insights contribute to the emergent literature in CEO sociopolitical activism. CEO
political ideology has been shown to be linked to a firm’s risk-taking (Christensen et al., 2015),
corporate social responsibility (Chin et al., 2013). Additionally, a related but distinct contract of
corporate political activism has been associated with a firm value (Bhagwat et al.,2020) and
corporate social responsibility (Gupta et al., 2017). In this paper, we show how CEO social
activism, a contract distinct from firm sociopolitical activism, affects shareholders' valuation of
the firm.
Our theory and findings have implications for several neighboring theoretical
perspectives beyond screening theory, most notably upper echelons theory and rational investor
theory. Despite Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) preliminary arrangement of upper echelons
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theory, highlighting the role of CEOs’ personal values, extant research on values has been
significantly limited compared to examinations into CEOs’ other attributes, chiefly CEOs’
experiences and personalities (see Finkelstein et al., 2009 for a detailed summary). In recent
years, researchers have begun to gain insights into CEOs’ value systems through their public
activism behaviors (e.g., Chin et al., 2013). Research has highlighted that CEOs’ values are
highly important for a range of organizational outcomes (e.g., Chin & Semadeni, 2017; Gupta et
al., 2018)). Building on the same logic, we show that CEO values reflected in activism behavior
have important consequences regarding shareholders. Shareholders seem to reject the idea that
CEOs should discuss their personal values in a public forum.
Finally, we contribute to the discussion of investor rationality. Recent work in behavioral
economics has shown that investors are neither fully rational nor fully irrational (Mukherjee &
De, 2019). An investor is confronted with a continuum that ranges from behavioral to rational
positions. Researchers have shown that a movement toward rationality is a choice since it is
costly to be rational because of the mental calculations involved. However, investors tend to
become rational if they see a benefit from being rational (Mukherjee & De, 2019). Even though
CSA is welcomed—even demanded—by customers (Chatterji & Toffel, 2019), investors react
negatively toward CSA. This could be because they fail to see the benefits (e.g., customer
purchasing intentions) arising from CSA.
4.2. Limitations and Future Research
There are several limitations to this research that could be avenues for future study. First,
we examine activism in only one public platform—Twitter. CEO activism might look different
and might have a different impact on other social media platforms such as Facebook, LinkedIn,
and YouTube because the way content is delivered is different in those platforms. Additionally,
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we do not know whether CEOs walk the talk- in that whether they mobilize the political
structures within the organization to implement their activism agendas. We only categorize CSA
into four dimensions. Future research can examine more granular aspects of CSA dimensions
and their effect on investor reaction. For instance, researchers can examine questions such as
whether reproductive rights activism has a different impact on shareholders' reaction than gun
rights activism.
4.3. Conclusion
This research attempts to theorize and quantify the effects of CEO activism on firms’
financial performance. We theorize and test these relationships within the framework of
screening theory. We find that CEO social activism generally leads to adverse investor reactions.
This negative effect is most prominent when there is interdimensional incongruence in CEO
social activism messages. In addition, we find that the negative effect of CEO social activism is
nullified in larger organizations.
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TABLE 1.1
Pairwise Correlations and Descriptive Statistics

Variables
(1) CAR
(2) CSA-dimension
(3) CSA-event
(4) Firm size
(5) Diversification
(6) CEO Ownership
(7) Past performance

* P<0.05

Mean
-.0008598
.8250839
.3731353
1.873957
1.9653
1.522635
.8948558

SD
.0506653
1.233004
.4836409
1.776987
.76814
2.693052
1.049271

(1)
1.000
-0.017*
-0.022*
0.013
0.013
-0.009
-0.014

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1.000
0.873*
0.049
0.109
0.025
-0.011

1.000
0.022
0.090
0.020
-0.026

1.000
0.298
-0.412
0.408

1.000
-0.130
-0.128

1.000
-0.113

1.000
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TABLE 1.2
Linear probability model depicting the effect of social activism on investor reaction (CAR)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
car
car
car
car
car
car
CEO Ownership

-0.0150*
(0.00551)

-0.0150*
(0.00554)

-0.0148*
(0.00554)

-0.0252***
(0.00546)

-0.0144**
(0.00412)

-0.0242***
(0.00623)

Past Performance

-0.0850*
(0.0354)

-0.0852*
(0.0361)

-0.0850*
(0.0358)

-0.102*
(0.0399)

-0.0557
(0.0300)

-0.0913*
(0.0368)

CSA event

-0.00283
(0.0229)

0.0730
(0.0402)

-0.0241
(0.0243)

-0.00132
(0.0345)

-0.00132
(0.0345)

-0.0629*
(0.0236)

2.614
(3.549)

2.356
(3.305)

2.507
(3.192)

0.190
(5.052)

3.587
(3.635)

1.496
(4.966)

Inverse Mills ratio

-0.0357**
(0.0119)

CSA dimensions

-0.0307
(0.0151)

Firm size

-0.0406**
(0.0142)

-0.0357*
(0.0152)

CSAevent*Firm size

0.0144*
(0.00672)

0.0101*
(0.00474)

Diversification

-0.00447
(0.00255)

-0.00185
(0.00280)

CSAevent*Diversification

0.00443
(0.00239)

0.00312
(0.00223)

Year fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.00184
(0.00228)
0.008
-77592.5
-77432.6
21913

0.00210
(0.00229)
0.009
-77595.3
-77427.4
21913

0.00208
(0.00230)
0.009
-77594.4
-77418.5
21913

0.00297
(0.00230)
0.009
-73563.5
-73380.6
20951

0.00457
(0.00266)
0.010
-73835.8
-73653.1
20799

0.00530
(0.00274)
0.010
-71530.9
-71325.0
20254

_cons
R2
AIC
BIC
N
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FIGURE 1.1
Graphical depiction of the moderating effect of firm size on the relationship between CEO
social activism event and investor reactions.
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FIGURE 1.2
Graphical depiction of the moderating effect of diversification on the relationship between
activism event and investor reaction.
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CHAPTER 2

WALKING THE WALK: THE EFFECTS OF CEO SOCIAL ACTIVISM ON
FIRMS’ SOCIAL PERFORMANCE

ABSTRACT
This study seeks to understand how a CEO’s social activism influences corporate social
performance. We hypothesize that CEO social activism will have a negative influence on a wide
variety of firm-level social performance indicators due to previous theory and research which
finds that firms have self-serving intentions behind corporate social responsibility. Consistent
with our prediction, we find that CEO social activism negatively influences the firms’ social
performance with respect to human rights. We also find partial support for a negative
relationship between CEO social activism and the firms’ subsequent social performance
regarding the natural environment. Contrary to our theoretical prediction, we find that CEO
social activism positively influences firms’ social performance with respect to the community
dimension; and we find no relationship with social performance related to employee well-being.
These findings suggest that by and large, CEO social activism has negligible or negative
influences on various aspects of the firm’s social performance, with the possible exception of
social activism within the firm’s local communities. We also find that CEO power sometimes
accentuates these relationships.

Keywords: CEO Social Activism, Corporate Social Performance, CEO Power
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1. INTRODUCTION
A corporation’s involvement in socio-political issues is not a new phenomenon
(McDonnell & Werner, 2016; Walker & Rea, 2014). Firms often take socio-political action on
issues that align with their strategies, such as issues pertaining to taxation (Baloria & Klassen,
2018) and regulation (Jerolmack & Walker, 2018). However, CEOs have recently begun
weighing in on social causes that are often not directly related to their core business. For
instance, the CEO of PayPal rescinded a plan of building a new campus in North Carolina
because the state passed a law that is viewed as discriminatory toward the LGBTQ community
(Katz & Eckholm, 2016). On the eve of the 2018 midterm elections, Ben and Jerry’s released an
ice-cream flavor named “Pecan Resist.” According to Ben and Jerry’s, the release of the flavor
was “about resisting the Trump administration’s regressive and discriminatory policies and
building a future that values inclusivity, equality, and justice for people of color, women, the
LGBTQ community, refugees, and immigrants” (Ben & Jerry’s, 2018).
Why is it that CEOs engage in socio-political activism? Scholars have argued that sociopolitical activism is a function of environmental pressure caused by broader social movements
and institutional pressures (Briscoe & Safford, 2008; Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014; Briscoe,
Gupta, & Anner, 2015; Hiatt, Grandy, & Lee, 2015; McDonnell & King, 2013; McDonnell,
King, & Soule, 2015; McDonnell & Werner, 2016). For example, there are situations when a
firm’s strategy is aligned with activism causes, such as when a firm endorses and supports
grassroots activists that promote a socio-political stance that benefits the firm (Walker, 2014). In
such instances, a firm’s socio-political activism is nothing more than an extension of its lobbying
effort (Walker, 2012). However, there are increasingly more situations when the CEO takes
socio-political stances that are controversial and have limited to no bearing on the firm’s
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business strategy (e.g., Chatterji & Toffel, 2019; Friedman & Gostin, 2017; Katz & Eckholm,
2016; McGregor, 2016).
Although studies have tried to uncover the antecedents of CEO social-political activism
(Branicki, Brammer, Pullen, & Rhodes 2021), little is known about the consequences of CEO
socio-political activism as it relates to firms' social performance. In this paper, we focus on social
activism that CEOs display in online social media across four dimensions of CEO social activism
(CSA): (1) natural environment, (2) human rights, (3) community well-being, and (4) employee
welfare. We then explore how these dimensions of activism affect each of the four aspects of the
firms’ social performance.
Legitimacy theorists posit that CEOs craft different rhetorical strategies in the hope of
achieving different types of legitimacy. Legitimacy theory suggests that there are three types of
legitimacy that firms strive to achieve: (1)moral, (2) cognitive, and (3) pragmatic legitimacy
(Suchman, 1995). Scholars have suggested that different rhetorical strategies are required to
attain these different types of legitimacy, namely values rhetoric for moral, normative rhetoric
for cognitive, and instrumental rhetoric for pragmatic legitimacy (Marais, 2012). In this study,
we theorize that CEO social activism is a values rhetoric strategy that is geared toward a broader
audience in order to gain moral legitimacy to favorably influence constituencies inside and
outside of the firm. We also theorize that such rhetoric can often be substitutive of the firms’
true moral standing (e.g., Prior, Surroca, & Tribó, 2008) which would be associated with
substandard social performance. In addition, we theorize that powerful CEOs are even less likely
to devote resources to improve firms’ social standing, even though they are partaking in values
rhetoric, since powerful CEOs tend to be insulated from stakeholder pressure (e.g., Li, Li, &
Minor, 2016).
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We find that CEO social activism is generally associated with diminished corporate
social performance, but not in all instances. The moderating effect of CEO power is also
different for different types of activism, suggesting the interaction between CEO power and CEO
social activism is more nuanced than anticipated.
Our theoretical framework and findings make several contributions to the literature on
non-market strategy. We theorize that different types of rhetoric can be used for different types
of audiences in order to attain different types of legitimacy. This is crucial because moral
legitimacy is critical for the survival of a firm, especially in a world where stakeholder needs are
becoming increasingly conflicting and bipolar (e.g., Davis, 2022), and where stakeholders seek
to rein in the power that firms have over their choice sets (e.g., Vasi & King, 2012).
We also contribute to the literature on CEOs’ rhetorical strategy by showcasing how
CEO social activism is a specific case of values rhetoric that is designed to be consumed by a
mass audience, to attract customers to the firm and generate “buzz”. This rhetorical strategy is
intentionally developed to be more general and align the interests of disparate stakeholder groups
with those of the firm. However, such rhetoric does not mean that CEOs would allocate
resources to improve the social standing of their firm. In fact, in many cases, these could be
substitutive of one another. CEOs often take part in values rhetoric specifically because their
firm does not intend to invest resources to improve its social standing.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on CEO social activism and power. We show that
not all CEO activism is a good thing, and that power can be corrosive to firms' social standing. In
a world where it is becoming a social norm for CEOs to be socially active, not all activism can
be beneficial for the broader stakeholders. Policymakers need to ensure that CEOs are held
accountable such that they may “walk the walk”.
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2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Rhetoric to Gain Legitimacy
Organizational legitimacy is one of the most critical issues that firms face in today’s business
environment. Organizational legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). This issue is gaining
importance in a post-crisis world as critics have voiced concerns about the firm’s role in today’s
society (Champion & Gendron, 2005). Mistrust has been specifically voiced regarding how
conscientiously firms are managed (Goodman, 2009).
Without negating their principal purpose of economic value creation, firms are expected
to be accountable for the impact of their activities on society. For instance, the European Union
has proclaimed that one of its objectives is to enhance corporate awareness of social and
environmental issues (Steurer et al., 2012). Similarly, the Business Roundtable has been adamant
about the social impact of the corporation and ways to hold firms accountable for their social
impact. These decisions are powered by stakeholders’ growing expectations in regard to more
responsible ways of conducting business operations. This rise in social and political pressures
concerning social performance has necessitated that firms integrate new values emerging in
society. As Boesso and Kumar (2007, p. 278) observed, “given the strategic and operational
complexities that are faced by most of the organizations today, a continued dialogue with not just
shareholders, but also with other stakeholder groups, appears to be necessary for the continued
success of a company.” Thus, firms today must not only communicate operational and strategic
decisions, but also commit resources and act on social issues.
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Being accountable regarding social issues can be risky for the firm. Although strategic
decisions often lead to outcomes that create conflict between stakeholders, choices regarding
firms’ social standing are even more contentious. First, firms need to provide meaning to an
ambiguous and multifaceted concept that is often vague for practitioners and academics alike
(Brammer & Millington, 2004; Kakabadse et al., 2005; Lydenberg, 2005; Matten & Crane,
2005). Firms also need to parse out the specific groups that they want to address in their social
commitment (Carroll, 1991). And in the process of doing so, firms have to defend why such
social standings are relevant, especially when the business case for social standings has yet to be
clearly demonstrated (Barnett, 2007). For instance, even though firm employees may have a
favorable attitude towards advancing certain social initiatives (e.g., diversity in recruitment,
career development, protection of employment), shareholders may be unhappy about such
initiatives when a firm is underperforming financially (Dincer, 2011). Similarly, while some
customer groups might want companies to take a stand regarding some social issues, other
customer groups might not be inclined for firms to get involved in contentious social issues.
Managing disparate stakeholders is of paramount importance for the firm. According to
legitimacy theory, corporate legitimacy is gained when firms operate within the standards and
beliefs of society and voluntarily disclose information to attain, maintain or repair legitimacy
with the relevant stakeholders (Deegan, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002). In this context and under the
pressure of changing societal expectations, firms are starting to introduce new dialogue with
stakeholders (Castelló & Lozano, 2011), especially to address social issues.
Although being transparent and responsible can help to build legitimacy, there are limits
on the amount of information that can be delivered as well as the content of such information.
Embracing a “self-promoting” approach may be counterproductive and harm a firm’s credibility
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(Morsing & Schultz, 2006). On the other hand, the right kind of communication can bolster a
firm’s social standing (Kakabadse et al., 2005). The goal and form of a firm’s communication
regarding its social standing have to be carefully assessed (Johansen & Nielsen, 2011).
Therefore, making an appropriate rhetorical choice regarding communication about social
standing is essential.
Rhetoric is defined as the art of persuasion by the means of written or spoken words
(Kennedy, 2006). The goal of rhetoric is to convey future intentions that may guide future action
and gain legitimacy both within and outside of the firm. It is a deliberate use of language in
structuring social action, and does not merely express the passive statement of preferences
(Chanal & Tannery, 2007). A rhetorical perspective, therefore, assumes that implicit categories
and structure of dialogue have been considered (Berg, 2004) and have been carefully evaluated
regarding the nature of its audience and the way it was formulated.
In this study, we focus on how CEOs' rhetorical strategies may be driven by their need to
attain a specific type of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). The first type, “moral” legitimacy, is
centered on a deliberate decision to solicit ethical approval concerning a firm’s actions
(Barkemeyer, 2007). Stakeholders tend to consider a firm as morally legitimate if it showcases
ethical behavior and the characteristics of good citizenship. In these cases, communication tends
to focus on values and moral principles (Reynolds & Yuthas, 2008). For instance, a firm’s CEO
can tweet about a firm’s moral standing regarding community welfare, post-COVID. In the
process of doing so, firms strive to build strong stakeholder commitment centered on shared set
values and principles that help to build legitimacy. The significance of values rhetorical
strategies increases when a firm faces organizational crisis, such as COVID, economic
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recessions, financial worries, strikes, fraud, or environmental disaster. This type of strategy can
assist a firm to defend its social posture (Young & Marais, 2012).
The second type of legitimacy, termed “cognitive”, hinges on reasoning in that
stakeholders are given the necessary information to comprehend and weigh a firm’s standing
(Suchman, 1995) on social issues. In order to develop cognitive legitimacy, a firm must provide
detailed information that illustrates its commitment to social causes. This type of rhetorical
strategy is known as normative rhetoric. For instance, to gain this type of legitimacy a firm’s
CEO might disclose detailed spending to improve community welfare in their annual letter to the
stakeholders. As such, cognitive legitimacy is attained through normative rhetoric that aligns a
firm with commonly accepted social practice trends.
Last, “pragmatic” legitimacy is based on the self-interest of a firm’s stakeholders, who
either want to influence a firm’s action or seek a tangible payback in return for granting
legitimacy for their own interests. In other words, if a firm fulfills stakeholders’ utility, they
provide legitimacy to the firm in return. As such, rhetorical strategies to improve a firm’s social
standing regarding pragmatic legitimacy would highlight the gains of being committed to social
issues. Such rhetorical strategies tend to be instrumental and outcome-oriented, such as an
improvement of a firm’s reputation, attracting talented employees, innovation in processes, and
product quality.
2.2. CEOs’ Role in Rhetorical Strategies
CEOs have a significant influence on such discretionary decisions, and therefore a firm’s
propensity to engage in socially responsible acts may be affected by chief executives’ moral
preferences (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Gerstner, König, Enders, & Hambrick, 2013;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). CEOs play a crucial role in addressing a firm’s social standing. This
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is especially true because of the conflicting interests of stakeholders: “management’s challenge is
to decide which stakeholders’ merit and receive consideration in the decision-making process”
(Carroll, 1991, p. 43). CEOs, set the tone at the top because they represent the firm in legal,
professional, and social contexts (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
Scholars suggest CEOs are responsible for making strategic decisions that resolve the
conflicting concerns of the firm’s stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992) through mediation. CEOs’
leadership is thus a determinant regarding what shape and orientation a firm’s actions would take
to address socially accepted norms of behavior (Fernando & Sim, 2011). Through their actions
and communications, CEOs play a role fundamental to a firm’s strategic communication (Chanal
& Tannery, 2007; Hung, 2011), because they possess a high level of discretion (Hambrick &
Fukutomi, 1991). In this context, rhetoric is a key element regarding stakeholder management
and a major responsibility of the CEO (Szwajkowski, 2000; Wiedermann-Goiran et al., 2003).
Communication and rhetorical content are increasingly powerful tools for stakeholder
management (Windell, 2006). This is confounded by the rise in the amount of information being
diffused (e.g., social media) and stakeholders’ sensitivity to actions undertaken by firms (Gray et
al., 1996). Communication regarding a firm's social standing has become crucial for CEOs (e.g.,
Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010) as a means of enhancing corporate and managerial
legitimacy (Arvidsson, 2010).
2.3. CEO Social Activism and Varieties of Social Performance
Although there could be many dimensions of CEO social activism, we focus on
dimensions that have a direct impact on corporate social performance. Within the literature on
corporate social responsibility (CSR), the concept of corporate social performance (CSP) is
widely researched but not often clearly defined. That is not to suggest that no definitions for
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CSP exist; rather, based on the stream of literature, CSP has been defined in numerous ways. The
existence of many definitions has led some scholars to conclude that CSP is a socially
constructed concept and could mean many different things to different people (Dahlsrud 2008).
Despite the lack of consensus about a single definition of CSP, there is a high level of agreement
on the notion that CSP has multiple dimensions, and its impact is measured differently by
different stakeholders (McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright 2006; Deegan 2002; Gray, Owen, &
Adams 1996; Dahlsrud 2008). We adopt the definitions provided by Pencle and Mălăescu (2016)
which identifies the four primary dimensions of corporate social activism:
The environment dimension considers the firm’s participation, attitude, and influence on
actions connected to natural resources such as water, energy waste, pollution, biodiversity,
greenhouse gasses, and, in general, material stewardship (McWilliams et al., 2006; Pencle &
Mălăescu, 2016). ). The employee dimension considers the firm’s participation, attitude, and
influence on actions associated with its internal stakeholders, including employees, suppliers,
and distributors (McWilliams et al., 2006; Pencle & Mălăescu, 2016). The human rights
dimension considers the firm’s participation, attitude, and influence on actions associated with
individual and collective rights of all stakeholders which includes minorities and
underrepresented groups, and concerted efforts for inclusiveness (McWilliams et al., 2006;
Pencle & Mălăescu, 2016). Finally, the community dimension considers the firm’s participation,
attitude, and influence on activities related to social issues such as civic engagement, indigenous
people, and societal development (McWilliams et al., 2006; Pencle & Mălăescu, 2016)
2.4. Substitutive Nature of CEO Social Activism
As discussed earlier, different forms of legitimacy require different rhetorical strategies
by the CEO. Research has shown that CEOs very rarely use normative rhetoric and are more
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likely to use such strategies if their financial performance is lackluster (Marais, 2012).
Researchers have also shown that instrumental rhetorical strategies to address pragmatic
legitimacy are generally used by the CEO to address internal stakeholders, such as the board of
directors (Marais, 2012). CEO social activism is a form of rhetoric geared toward achieving
moral legitimacy among the broader stakeholders (e.g., Marais, 2012) as such, it is a values
rhetoric to drive home the core values of the firm. CEO activism in social media, such as Twitter,
is one such deliberate rhetorical strategy (e.g., Steele & Lock, 2015), geared toward achieving
moral legitimacy.
However, researchers have also found that investment in social standing and managers’
moral values can “substitute” for each other. For example, Prior, Surroca , & Tribó (2008) found
that managers who engage in earning manipulation are more likely to invest in firms’ social
performance because they want to shield themselves from outside scrutiny by using firms’ social
performance as a smokescreen from their unethical behavior. They also find that such behavior is
greater when there is a greater discrepancy between firms' social and financial performance.
Values rhetoric is therefore used for corporate moral legitimacy, because such rhetoric aims to
create emotions and passions to seduce the audience and allay their concerns about the firm's
behavior (Marais, 2012). Researchers have suggested that such rhetoric is often used for myth
construction and for creating a firm's identity and does not represent firms’ commitment to social
causes (e.g., Igalens, 2007).
When CEOs take part in values rhetoric such as values related to the environment,
employees, community, and human rights, they seek to gain moral legitimacy among the broader
stakeholders. However, as we discussed earlier, values rhetoric does not imply that the firm is
going to increase resource allocation toward social causes, or even that CEOs truly care about
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social performance. In fact, morality and social welfare can be substitutive (e.g., Prior et al.,
2008). We contend that when CEOs deliberately use values rhetoric in social media forums,
they are less likely to mobilize resources to improve firms’ social performance, because they
consider such rhetorical strategies as substitutes for allocation of resources to improve the firm’s
societal impact in order to gain moral legitimacy.
H1. CEO social activism related to a) environment b) employees c) human rights
and d) community dimensions is negatively related to firms’ social performance
along those same dimensions.
2.5. Moderating Influence of CEO Power
CEOs differ in how much power they hold, and such differences moderate the extent to
which CEOs’ dispositions are exhibited in firm-level outcomes (Finkelstein, 1992; Hayward &
Hambrick, 1997). Since CEO activism is a blatant expression of personal beliefs and bears a
considerable risk that the CEO would be seen as merely promoting personal agendas, a CEO’s
power is particularly crucial in forecasting such behaviors (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021). In fact,
we anticipate that a requisite amount of power is essentially mandatory for even contemplating
activism, particularly vivid activism.
Although CEOs can obtain power from their own virtues, for example, by being
charismatic or having unique skills (e.g., Finkelstein, 1992; Flynn & Staw, 2004) and from
having broadly distributed shareholders (e.g., Galaskiewicz, 1997), notably established are the
variations in CEOs’ power in comparison to that of their boards (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991;
Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009). CEOs may vary in regards to financial ownership of
their firms relative to outside directors, which confers formal voting rights power and legitimacy
(Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988); they diverge in their structural power, as some CEOs also

43
occupy the position of board chair, but others do not (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994); and they
diverge in the extent to which their boards are cautious and independent (Westphal &
Fredrickson, 2001).
Fluctuations in CEO power influence CEO-specific outcomes, such as dismissal and
compensation (Boeker, 1992; Main, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1993). CEOs’ power also moderates
relationships between CEOs’ proclivities and strategic outcomes. For example, studies have
shown that CEOs’ power moderates the relationship between various indicators of CEOs’ hubris
and the magnitude of premiums paid for large acquisitions (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), as
well as the likelihood of founder CEOs effectively blocking takeover bids (Gao & Jain, 2012).
Research in this stream of the literature suggests that CEO power is a crucial contextual
factor that determines the extent to which the CEOs’ preferences are reflected in a firm’s
outcomes. Consequently, we expect that powerful CEOs are even less likely to mobilize
resources to improve their firms' social standing if they are using values rhetoric on social media.
This is because powerful CEOs are more insulated from outside stakeholders’ pressure (Prior et
al., 2008) and are less likely to act on their values rhetoric.
H2. CEO power moderates the negative relationships between CEO social
activism related to a) environment b) employees c) human rights and d) community
dimensions and firms’ social performance, such that as CEO power increases, the
relationship becomes stronger.
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Data and Sample
Our sample frame consists of all CEOs of publicly traded firms in the USA, which
includes firms on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. We track the CEOs of publicly
traded firms who are active on Twitter, from which we collect CEO social activism data. Twitter
is a public forum where CEOs can express their values and opinions. Twitter is ranked as the
fourth most-visited website in the world, has over 300 million active users (Similarweb, 2020),
and is widely regarded as one of the most influential social media platforms. We track CEOs
who are active on Twitter between the years 2007 to 2020.
More specifically, we follow several steps to collect the data. First, the online platform
CrunchBase tracks the social media presence of the CEOs of publicly traded firms. We matched
CrunchBase with the ExecuComp database on CEOs’ first and last names and their company
name. This allowed us to collect both CEO Twitter handles and their firm-specific information.
Our initial sample contained 253 CEOs who had a presence on Twitter during the sample period.
Then we manually checked whether the Twitter account belongs to the CEO or whether it is a
company account where the CEO is sometimes mentioned. This dropped the number of accounts
to 153, which belong to the CEO personally. After we established that the 153 CEO accounts are
trackable, we used Twitter’s API (Application Programming Interface), which is available to
developers and researchers, and wrote a scraper program using R programming language’s
TwitterR library to collect all of the tweets written by these 153 CEOs over the period of January
2007, when Twitter came into existence, to November 2020.
Our initial data contained 330,000 tweets. However, many of these tweets were solely
about firms’ strategy, profitability, organizational structure, and performance, and did not relate
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to CEO social activism. Therefore, we created a filter using a supervised machine learning
package, which uses a “Latent Dirichlet Allocation” algorithm that scanned the data about
strategy, profitability, organizational structure, and performance-related words among these
tweets and discarded the tweets that mentioned those words. After discarding those tweets, the
final sample contained 175,000 tweets from 135 CEOs.
We then merged this data using Twitter CEOs’ firms and years with KLD ratings with
data from Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini, and Company (KLD), a financial advisory firm that
specializes in Corporate Social Responsibility evaluations (Godfrey et al., 2009; Mattingly &
Berman, 2006; Waddock & Graves, 1997). KLD ranks firms along the four CSR dimensions
using a cumulative ranking system . This merge allowed construction of firms’ social
performance-related dependent variables. Finally, we merged this data with the ISS governance
database to create the CEO power index. The final sample consisted of 153 firm-year
observations. Variables were log-transformed if they had a non-normal distribution.
3.2. Variables and Measures
3.2.1. Dependent Variable: Corporate social performance along the four previousl described
dimensions was measured by using KLD ratings, which have been broadly regarded as the most
comprehensive data available to measure CSP (e.g., Choi & Wang, 2009; Graves & Waddock,
1994; Kacperczyk, 2009). We operationalize CSP as a net score of KLD at tweetyear+1 of the four
CSR dimensions reported in the data following the most commonly utilized approach in the
literature (Choi & Wang, 2009; Dahlmann & Brammer, 2011; David et al., 2007; Graves &
Waddock, 1994; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Hull & Rothenberg, 2008; Wong et al., 2011). The
KLD data contains seven dimensions including environment, employee, human rights,
community, corporate governance, diversity and product dimensions. KLD ranks each firms’
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strengths and weaknesses along all seven dimensions (see Appendix A for a breakdown of
number of strengths and weeknessses, and Appendix B for detailed descriptions of strengths and
weaknesses indicators). Since we are only concerned about CEO social activism along
environment, employee, human rights, and community dimensions, we ignored the other three
dimensions. To construct our measure for each of the four dimensions, we took the difference
between the sum of strength indicators and the sum of weakness indicators (e.g., Barnett &
Salomon, 2012). To address reverse causality issues, this variable was lagged by one year.

3.2.2. Independent Variables: To measure the CEO’s social activism along the corporate social
responsibility dimensions, we conducted a text analysis of the tweets. We used the text analysis
software CAT scanner (McKenny & Short, 2012) and the dictionary established by Pencle and
Mălăescu (2016). As mentioned earlier in the data collection section, in addition to matching
with chrunchbase database, we manually checked to make shure that these twitter accounts
belonged to the CEOs themselves, and did not just mention the CEO. The analysis generated a
set of word counts for words such as “Discriminatory,” “Bio Diversities,” “Medicaid,” and
“white privilege.” Pencle and Mălăescu (2016) provide a valid and reliable dictionary for CSP
along four dimensions — human rights, social and community, environment, and employee, and
their data dictionary was used in this study as well. In this study, we measure CEOs’ social
activism relating to each of these dimensions in each tweet by measuring the frequency of word
usage along the four individual dimensions of the CEO’s Social Activism. See Table 1 for
detailed descriptive statistics of the variables.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
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3.2.3. Moderator Variable: we calculated an additive index of CEO power (Diamantopoulos &
Winklhofer, 2001; McDonald, Westphal, & Graebner, 2008), comprising three variables that
have been widely used in past studies (Finkelstein, 1992; Pollock, Fischer, & Wade, 2002;
Haynes & Hillman, 2010): an indicator variable for CEO duality, coded as one if the CEO was
also board chair; the CEO’s relative ownership, calculated as the proportion of the percentage of
stock owned by outside directors and the percentage of stock owned by the CEO; and the
percentage of outside directors appointed after the CEO. In order to verify whether all three
indicators belong to the underlying construct of CEO power, we constructed a principal
component analysis model with varimax rotation. All three indicators loaded onto a single factor
(Eigenvalue>1) indicating construct validity of CEO power. See Table 2 for a detailed analysis.
We then standardized and logged this variable as a convention.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
3.2.4. Control Variables: A set of control variables that are standard in corporate social
performance literature (e.g., O’Sullivan et al., 2021) were introduced in the analysis. We
collected all control variables from the Compustat yearly database. We controlled for the firm,
CEO, & industry characteristics that could impact corporate social performance.
We used firm size because previous researchers have repeatedly found that it positively
affects social performance (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Udayasankar, 2008; Waddock & Graves,
1997). We measured firm size using the natural log of net sales (Brammer & Millington, 2008;
Kacperczyk et al.,2008). We added ROA (return on assets) as a control variable as well, because
it signifies the most pertinent information regarding the results of resource allocation by a firm,
as it seeks competitive advantage (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008) and has been shown to affect firms’
social performance (Padgett & Galan, 2010). ROA is calculated as operating income over total
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assets. We also controlled for the Market-to-book ratio which is calculated by dividing the total
market value of the firm by the total value of the firm. Market value, which signifies a firm’s
growth and investment opportunity, has been shown to affect corporate social performance (e.g.,
Flammer, 2015; O'Sullivan et al., 2021). In addition, we controlled for firms' R&D intensity,
which has shown to have a direct impact on a firm’s social performance (e.g., Padgett & Galan,
2010). We calculated R&D intensity by dividing total expenditure on R&D by total sales (e.g.,
McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). A firm’s governance structure has been shown to affect its
corporate social performance. For instance, Zhang et al., (2013) has shown that independent
directors affect firms’ social performance. In addition, Judge and Dobbins (1996) found that
outsider’s awareness of CEO decision style affects firm level outcomes. As such we control for
proportion of independent directors which is calculated by dividing the total number of outsiders
by the total number of board members (e.g., Zhang et al., 2013).
We controlled for CEO tenure, calculated by taking the difference between when the
CEO took office and when the CEO left office. Tenure has been shown to affect firm-level
outcomes including social performance (e.g., O’Sullivan et al., 2021). We controlled for the
CEO’s unexercised options, which are calculated as the value of the CEO’s unexercised stock
options. CEO options are one of the key incentive alignment mechanisms used to keep CEOs’
interests aligned with that of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Options are used to incentivize
managerial risk-taking (e.g., Sanders, 2001) and can affect many firm-level outcomes including
corporate social performance (e.g., Padgett & Galan, 2010).
Finally, we included eight dummy variables for industry sectors (using primary two-digit
SIC codes of adopting firms) (coefficients for these dummy variables are not reported and are
available from the authors).
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3.3. Data Analysis and Results
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation matrix of the variables.
To assess whether the variables in our study are affected by multicollinearity, we first construct a
linear probity model on our theoretical variables. Afterward, we utilize regression postestimation method for assessing the variance inflation factors (VIF) of our theoretical variables.
The mean VIF was less than 3 for all models. Therefore, multicollinearity should not be an issue
for this analysis (Hair et al., 1998).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Our hypothesized relationships which predicted the effect of CSA’s four dimensions on
the likelihood of focal firms performing well along those CSP dimensions were tested within a
generalized least squared (GLS) framework allowing for random effects. We also conducted the
analysis within a fixed effect framework and conducted the Hausman test to check if errors are
correlated with the regressors. The Hausman test failed to reject the Null (p > 0.05) suggesting
the random effect was appropriate.
We acknowledge that our analysis may be prone to endogeneity concerns. For example,
perhaps the firms have already invested in social causes and therefore the CEOs are engaged in
social activism to highlight the fact that firms have invested in those social causes. To minimize
this issue, we lag all our independent and moderator variables one year. In addition, as noted by
Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, and Lalive (2010, p. 1103), finding an appropriate instrumental
variable to test for endogeneity is “one of the biggest challenges that researchers face.” Because
we could not theoretically identify a covariate that is correlated with the treatment variable and
uncorrelated with the outcome variable, we use a lagged dependent variable (Lu et al., 2018) as
an instrument to estimate our full theoretical model in order to address endogeneity concerns.
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Greene (2003) outlines a generalized least square approach with stringent asymptotic normality
assumption in which a lagged dependent variable is appropriate. We follow Greene (2003) and
estimate our theoretical model using a GLS estimator and use the lagged dependent variable as
an instrumental variable. Instrument validity tests confirmed the viability of this method.
In each of tables, Model 1 contains only the control variables, Model 2 includes the
addition of the independent variables, Model 3 adds the moderator variable, and Model 4
represents the instrumented full model. The tested sample contained 153 firm-year observations.
Since KLD scores are measured yearly, we constructed a simple yearly average of CEO social
activism scores. We also lagged all treatment variables except for industry and firm size by one
year.
Table 4 presents the regression results of CSP performance along the environmental
dimension on CEO social activism along the environmental dimension. The coefficient of CEO
social activism along the environmental dimension is negative but not significant (β = -2.34; p >
0.05). Therefore, we did not find support for H1a. In addition, CEO power did not moderate this
relationship, rejecting H2a (β = 0.66; p > 0.05).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Table 5 presents the regression results of CSP along the employee dimension on CEO
social activism along the employee rights dimension. The coefficient of CEO social activism
along the employee rights dimension is negative but not significant (β = -43.9; p>0.05). Thus,
Hypothesis 1b was not supported. In addition, we did not find support for moderating the effect
of CEO power (β =21.1, p>0.05).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
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Table 6 presents the regression results of CSP along the human rights dimension on CEO
social activism along the human rights dimension. The coefficient CSP along the human rights
dimension is negative and significant (β = -1.60, p<0.05). As such, H1c was supported.
However, we did not find support for the moderating effect of CEO power (β = 0.13, p > 0.05).
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Table 7 presents the regression results of CSP along the community dimensions on CEO
social activism with respect to the community dimensions. The coefficient of CEO social
activism along community dimensions is positive and significant (β = 3.13; p<0.05), which
suggests a relationship opposite to the hypothesized direction. As such, H1d was rejected.
Interestingly, CEO power did intensify this relationship in the original direction that was
hypothesized, therefore, H2d was supported (β = -1.26; p<0.05) .
[Insert Table 7 about here]
To analyze this further, we conducted marginal effects analysis and created interaction
plots of the simple slopes of CEO social activism along the community dimension and CEO
power. Figure 1 depicts the predictive margins of the interaction plots. We observe at low levels
of CEO power as depicted by the blue line the effect of CEO social activism along the
community dimension on fims’ social performance regarding the community is positive.
However, as CEO power increases, the relationship between CEO social activism along the
community dimension and firms’ social performace along the community dimension becomes
negative as depicted by the red and green lines. As such, CEO power decreases the impact of
CEO social activism for this particular dimension. All of these results are discussed below.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
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4. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we investigate the effect of CEO social activism on firms’ social
performance. In order to do so, we utilize legitimacy theory by incorporating how CEOs use
rhetorical strategy in order to legitimize social activism. We theorize that firms need to employ
different types of rhetorical strategies for different types of legitimacy gains. In this particular
case, the social activism of the CEO is a type of value rhetoric that is geared towards achieving
moral legitimacy among the various stakeholders of the firms (Marais, 2012). However, we
argue that value rhetoric is often used to substitute for true morality (e.g., Prior et al., 2008) and
thus when such rhetoric is used by the CEO, they are less likely to devote resources towards the
improvement of the social standing of the firm (e.g., Marais, 2012). We also argue that CEO
power would positively impact the negative relationship between CEO social activism and the
firm’s social standing, because powerful CEOs are shielded from stakeholder pressure and are
even less likely to “walk the walk.”
First, we hypothesized that CEO social activism regarding the natural environment was
negatively related to firms’ social performance regarding the natural environment. We also
hypothesized that CEO power strengthened this negative relationship. We did not find support
for this relationship. Second, we did not find support for the hypothesized negative relationship
between CEO social activism regarding employees and a firm’s social performance along the
employee dimension. We also did not find support for CEO power moderating this relationship.
Third, we find that CEO social activism regarding human rights was negatively and significantly
related to firms’ social performance regarding human rights, providing support for our theory.
We also did not find support for the moderating effect of CEO power.
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Finally, we find that CEO social activism regarding the community was positively and
significantly related to firms’ social performance regarding the community. Interestingly, this
relationship is opposite to what we hypothesized. We discuss the consequences of this finding in
the Implications section below. We also find CEO power moderated this relationship in the
hypothesized direction such that at high levels of CEO power the relationship between CEO
activism along the community dimension and the firm’s social performance along the
community dimension became negative. This finding is discussed in detail in Figure 1 and
associated marginal effects analysis.
4.1. Implications for Theory
Our first contribution is to the theory of moral legitimacy. We hypothesize that CEO
social activism is a form of value rhetoric designed to attain moral legitimacy. However, as Prior
et al. (2008) suggested, true morals can be hard to assess and CEO activism could be substitutive
for resource allocation to improve firms' social standing. Such activism is designed to decouple
the firm’s actual performance from its rhetoric (Sauerwald & Su, 2019).
Our theory also suggests that CEO social activism is a deliberate value rhetoric that is
designed to attract the masses and create awareness about the activism issue. Such value rhetoric
is designed to attract customers and generate buzz. It is conceivable that such value rhetoric is
also a self-promotional strategy by the CEO. Recent work by Lovelace, Bundy, Pollock and
Hambrick (2021) suggests that self-promoting CEOs are more likely to achieve celebrity status
through sustained coverage by news media. The deliberative nature of value rhetoric such as
CEO social activism would suggest that some CEOs might be self-promoting to increase their
exposure through the use of such rhetorical techniques.
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Among all four hypothesized negative relationships, we found that the effect of CEO
social activism regarding local communities had a positive impact on firms’ social performace
regarding local communities. Typical involvement of businesses with the community is seen in
areas of education, health, and income generation. CSR towards the community is seen in
terms of philanthropic giving, public-private partnerships, community relationships, and
participation in social and economic development issues. For instance, Microsoft’s Airband
initiative is geared toward extending affordable broadband access to millions of people in their
local communities, since many people in rural America lack fast broadband access. In addition,
Microsoft’s TechSpark program is designed to help to close the skills gap and prepare employers
to hire and support employees in new ways. GM, in collaboration with the Muscular Dystrophy
Association, offered a STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) programming track at
its annual summer camp. Students with neuromuscular disabilities attended the virtual camp free
of cost to undergo STEM learning. Participants heard from GM STEM experts about the
importance of accessibility inclusion in STEM fields and vehicle design. Although the other
dimensions of social activism might not generate tangible and immediate benefits for firms,
investments in community development initiatives may help a firm gain competitive advantages
through tax savings, decreased regulatory burden, and improvements in the quality of local labor
(Waddock & Graves, 1997).
There is some empreical evidence that suggests that investing in local community is
positively related to firm perfomace (e.g., Mishra & Suar, 2010; Rockefeller, 2003). A socially
responsible image of the firm among the local community improves the brand loyalty of
consumers (Mishra & Suar, 2010). Consumers reward firms that practice good corporate
citizenship through higher and prolonged patronage (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006). In addition,
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positive impact in communities enhances firms’ overall product evaluation by consumers
(Brown & Dacin, 1997). Consumers pay attention to the CSR records of firms, involving
primarily their community initiatives, while making purchacing decisions (Gildea, 1994; Owen
& Scherer, 1993). These firm performance benefits, both in terms of financial gains and
customer purchasing intentions, from community-related social investments might be the reason
why CEOs’ activism regarding the community dimesion is positively related to the firms’
performance along the community dimension.
From the perspective of moral legitimacy, it is more difficult for consumers to
meaningfully measure whether CEOs are walking the walk regarding environment, employee or
human rights dimensions, because consumers cannot directly see the impact of those social
investiments. However, they are much better equipped to assess firms’ investment in local
comminty as they are part of it. Therefore, consumers might sanction the firm negatively if the
CEO does not walk the walk regarding the community dimension and withhold giving the firm
the moral legitimacy it seeks.
Our results also indicate that powerful CEOs could be more insulated than their
contemporaries in that they may use social activism as value rhetoric to substitute for firms’
resource commitment to social issues. By highlighting this relationship, we contribute to the
conversation in upper echelons and CEO discretion. Consistent with recent theoretical work in
CEO social activism (e.g. Hambrick & Wowak, 2021), CEO power is a crucial contextual factor
that determines the amount of discretion available to the CEO to shield them from both internal
and external forces.
Our tests show that the relationship between CEO social activism types and firms' social
performance along those different dimensions follow different directionality. Typically, all four
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dimensions of firms’ social performance are lumped together in a composite measure of social
performance. Our results suggest that it might be better to separate these dimensions because
such a measure gives us a more nuanced understanding of firms’ social performance. Scholars
have suggested that firms' social performance means different things to different stakeholders
(Dahlsrud 2008). As such there might be varying levels of resources allocated to various aspects
of social performance depending upon the type of stakeholders that the firm wants to appease.
Breaking down social performance by the four categories we discussed not only sharpens the
empirical precision of the results but also illustrates different causal relationships that future
studies can uncover.
4.2. Implications for Managers and Policymakers
One of the primary functions of the board of directors is to hold managers accountable on
behalf of the stakeholders. The directors have to make sure that CEOs’ social activism is truly
beneficial for the shareholders, so that substitutive non-market strategy truly does what it is
supposed to do- give moral legitimacy to the firm and create a buzz on social media. If CEO
activism does not generate those benefits, it might be interpreted by customers as CEOs
grandstanding and being offish.
Our findings suggest that CEOs should only be active in social media if they are walking
the walk. Although consumers might not be able to detect if the CEO does not walk the walk
regarding environment, human rights, and the employee dimension, other stakeholders (e.g.,
investors, employees) might detect such deviation and negatively sanction the firm.
Policymakers also have to hold CEOs accountable for their actions. If they are not
walking the walk, there might be other underlying issues associated with the firm that the
securities and exchange commission (SEC) may want to investigate. For instance, Prior et al.,
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(2008) found that earnings management is associated with higher corporate social performance.
Since CEO social activism is substitutive of social performance, it follows that CEO social
activism might be associated with earnings management.
4.3. Limitations
Our study has several limitations. First, we excluded other social media platforms such as
LinkedIn, YouTube, and Facebook where long-form communication is possible. Twitter limits
each tweet to 280 characters, which means CEO social activism presents differently on this
platform than it does in other media. The reason for choosing Twitter is that, unlike LinkedIn,
YouTube or Facebook, Twitter posts are always public and are geared toward a broader
audience. However, it would be interesting to explore these relationships on other platforms.
Relatedly, since Twitter’s character count is limited to 280, topic modellling (e.g. LDA, FCA) to
distill more nunanced dimensions of CEO social activism is a challenge. Such machine learning
algorithms require many words to train them to recognize relevant patterns, and therefore are
infeasible for analyzing a single tweet. Additionally, scholars have argued that a dictionary-based
approach, such as the one used in this paper, sometimes fails to detect context or detects false
negatives.
Second, CEO social activism may take other forms in traditional media such as television
and newspaper interviews, opinion pieces, participation in town halls, rallies, and protests. Not
only that the rhetoric used, and casual effects of activism in these might be different from social
media as well.
A third limitation is our assumption that these are one-way, causal relationships. While
we lagged the dependent variable to follow CEO social activism, it is possible that poor firm
social performance may lead to CEOs trying to regain legitimacy through online activism.
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Future research should examine the possibility that CEO online activism is a response to
faltering social performance.
4.4. Future Research Directions
In this paper we examined the effect of CEO social activism on firm social performance.
One stark finding is that CEO social activism regarding the human rights dimension was
negative related to firms’ social performance along the human rights dimension. Future research
could examine whether firms are sanctioned by stakeholders if they do not walk the walk. For
instance, if CEOs speak publicly about human rights and do not actually invest to improve
human rights, do other firms in the same industry cut ties with the dissenting firm (less
collaboration)? Do employees leave such firms? How do these dissenting firms fare in the labor
market for talented employees? Do rating agencies (such as Moody’s) identify such dissent and
adjust their rankings?
4.5. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the effects of CEO social activism on firm performance. We
theorize that this rhetorical strategy is a substitute for resource allocation to improve firms' social
standing. We also suggest that CEO power would amplify this relationship. We find that CEO
social activism in the human rights dimension is negatively related to firms’ social performance
in this area, supporting our theory. We also find that, consistent with our prediction, CEO power
affects this relationship such that as CEO power increases, the effect of CEO social activism
regarding human rights becomes negative and stronger on firms’ social performance along the
human rights dimension. We also find that CEOs’ social activism related to the community
dimension is positively related to firms’ social performance. Our paper highlights the substitutive
nature of CEO social activism. We find that when CEO social activism in social media is
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substitutive of firms’ resource allocation decisions to improve their social standing and powerful
CEOs are even more likely to not “walk the walk” with respect to social activism since they are
more shielded from repercussion than their peers.
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TABLE 2.1
Descriptive statistics of CSA dimensions
Variables

Obs

Mean

CSA-Environment
CSA-Employee
CSA-Human rights
CSA-Community

195
195
195
195

.17
.3
.167
.325

Std.
Dev.
.173
.312
.185
.313

Min

Max

p1

p99

Skew.

Kurt.

0
0
0
0

1
2.723
1.348
2.275

0
0
0
0

1
1.25
1
1.76

2.207
2.705
2.461
2.272

9.659
15.935
11.553
11.393
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TABLE 2.2
Factor Analysis of CEO Power Variable
Factor analysis/correlation
Method: principal-component factors
Rotation: orthogonal varimax
Factor
Factor1

Variance
1.290

Number of obs
=
Retained factors
=
Number of params =
Difference
.

394
1
3

Proportion
0.430

Cumulative
0.430

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(3) = 27.04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
Variable
Relative owensership
Duality
Percent outsiders appointed

Factor1
0.506
0.683
0.752

Uniqueness
0.743
0.533
0.434

Variables
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TABLE 2.3
Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std.
(1)
(2)
Dev.
(1) Env Performance
.63
1.55
1.0
(2) Empl Performance
.75
1.9
.34***
1.0
(3) Hrts Performance
.07
.41
-.02
.01
(4) Comm Performance
.18
.77
.19***
.05
(5) CSA-Env
.17
.17
-.06
-.04
(6) CSA-Empl
.3
.31
.05
-.04
(7) CSA-Hrts
.17
.19
-.04
-.05
(8) CSA-Comm
.33
.31
.12**
.08
(9) CEO-power
.32
.79
-.03
.02
(10) Firm Size
.01
1
.32***
.14***
(11) Past performance
2.06
2.03
.03
.05
(12) Market to book
.01
.09
.06
-.05
(13) R&D intensity
.33
6.9
.06
.05
(14) Num of director
.79
.11
-.05
.08
(15) CEO tenure
8.97
8.86
-.19***
-.17***
(16) CEO options
6.76
16.29
-.05
-.02
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(3)

(4)

1.0
.21***
-.03
.09*
.04
.08*
-.05
.11**
.13**
.02
.07
.13**
-.11**
-.03

1.0
-.10*
-.05
-.02
-.02
.06
.06
.06
-.05
.01
.08
-.07
.08*

(5)

1.0
.34***
.44***
.33***
.03
.07
.01
-.02
-.23***
-.01
-.02
.05

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

1.0
.71***
.75***
.05
.25***
-.01
.04
-.10
.04
-.03
.00

1.0
.62***
-.03
.21***
-.03
.00
-.11*
.00
.00
.02

1.0
.03
.33***
.02
.04
-.18**
-.01
-.02
.02

1.0
.05
-.08
.01
.07
.40***
.07
-.05

1.0
-.03
.14***
-.05
-.01
.15***
-.03

1.0
.01
.00
.15***
-.11**
.62***

(12)

1.0
.07
-.02
.03
.02

(13)

1.0
-.09
-.02
-.01

(14)

1.0
-.16***
.07

(15)

1.0
-.05

(16)

1.0
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TABLE 2.4
GLS regression of the effect of CEO social activism on firms’ environmental
performance
(1)

(2)

(3)

Firm size

0.64***
(0.16)

-0.13
(0.54)

0.60***
(0.16)

(4)
Instrumented
-0.15
(0.77)

Past performance

-0.22
(0.19)

-0.52+
(0.29)

-0.21
(0.19)

-0.41
(0.36)

Market to book

3.39**
(1.25)

3.84***
(1.05)

3.30**
(1.24)

3.72**
(1.15)

R&D intensity

0.0051
(0.01)

0.00070
(0.01)

0.0021
(0.01)

-0.0076
(0.01)

Proportion of outsiders

-0.55
(0.74)

-1.24
(1.18)

-0.96
(0.80)

-2.42
(2.75)

CEO tenure

-0.020
(0.02)

-0.035
(1.25)

-0.024
(0.02)

-0.041
(0.37)

CEO options

-0.00032
(0.00)

-0.00044
(0.01)

-0.00032
(0.00)

-0.00044
(0.00)

Industry

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

CSA-Environment (ENV)

-1.06
(3.86)

CEO power

-2.34
(6.90)
0.19
(0.16)

CSA-ENV*CEO power

_cons
N
Chi-squared

0.32
(0.56)
0.66
(2.65)

1.84*
(0.82)
153
52.0

Standard errors in parentheses
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

2.90
(32.24)
153
27.2

2.04*
(0.83)
153
51.8

3.66
(10.09)
153
29.0
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TABLE 2.5
GLS Regression of CEO social activism on the firm’s employee welfare
performance
(1)

(2)

(3)

Firm size

0.32
(0.21)

2.34
(1.52)

0.33
(0.21)

(4)
Instrumented
1.59
(1.51)

Past perform-ance

0.16
(0.29)

-0.47
(1.21)

0.14
(0.30)

0.62
(1.58)

Market to book

-1.56
(3.08)

-2.79
(11.72)

-1.40
(3.10)

-13.0
(18.99)

R&D intensity

0.012
(0.03)

-0.025
(0.11)

0.013
(0.03)

-0.13
(0.19)

Proportion of outsiders

0.56
(1.41)

6.92
(6.80)

0.69
(1.65)

12.8
(13.44)

CEO tenure

-0.0091
(0.02)

-0.032
(0.09)

-0.0083
(0.02)

-0.12
(0.16)

CEO options

-0.00032
(0.00)

0.00044
(0.00)

-0.00032
(0.00)

0.00056
(0.00)

Industry

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

CSA-Employee (EMP)

-27.0
(17.10)

CEO power

-43.9
(37.37)
-0.046
(0.26)

CSA-EMP*CEO power

_cons

-5.47
(5.06)
21.1
(18.76)

0.42
(1.38)
153
17.1

N
Chi-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

1.45
(5.38)
153
3.59

0.37
(1.47)
153
16.4

-0.44
(7.58)
153
2.09
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TABLE 2.6
GLS Regression of CEO Social Activism on firms’ human rights performance
(1)

(2)

(3)

Firm size

0.081**
(0.03)

0.087
(0.12)

0.084**
(0.03)

(4)
Instrumented
-0.30
(0.19)

Past performance

0.020
(0.04)

0.13
(0.12)

0.015
(0.04)

0.17
(0.13)

Market to book

-0.68
(0.51)

-0.60
(0.74)

-0.61
(0.52)

-0.44
(0.62)

R&D intensity

0.0045
(0.00)

0.0056
(0.01)

0.0052
(0.00)

0.0051
(0.01)

Proportion of outsiders

0.20
(0.21)

1.26*
(0.52)

0.32
(0.25)

1.35**
(0.52)

CEO tenure

-0.0020
(0.00)

-0.00038
(0.01)

-0.0011
(0.00)

-0.0044
(0.04)

CEO options

-0.000014
(0.00)

-0.000020
(0.00)

-0.000014
(0.00)

-0.00010
(0.00)

Industry

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

CSA-Human Rights (HR)

-2.11*
(0.87)

CEO Power

-1.60*
(0.73)
-0.032
(0.04)

CSA-HR*CEO power

_cons

-0.13
(0.20)
N
153
Chi-squared
26.2
Standard errors in parentheses
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

-0.067
(0.12)
0.13
(0.29)

-0.87
(0.54)
153
9.14

-0.20
(0.22)
153
26.4

-1.07
(1.23)
153
15.0
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TABLE 2.7
GLS Regression of CEO Social Activism on the community welfare performance
(1)
Firm size

0.022
(0.02)

-0.34
(0.22)

0.019
(0.02)

(4)
Instrumented
-0.30
(0.20)

Past performance

0.018
(0.03)

-0.019
(0.16)

0.025
(0.03)

-0.064
(0.16)

Market to book

-1.76***
(0.46)

-1.24
(0.90)

-1.82***
(0.46)

-0.82
(1.01)

R&D intensity

0.0039
(0.00)

0.011
(0.01)

0.0034
(0.00)

0.012
(0.01)

Proportion of outsiders

-0.029
(0.16)

-1.19+
(0.68)

-0.15
(0.20)

-1.95*
(0.91)

ceo_tenure

-0.0021
(0.00)

-0.00021
(0.02)

-0.0029
(0.00)

-0.0062
(0.02)

CEO options

-0.0000096
(0.00)

-0.000083
(0.00)

-0.000011
(0.00)

-0.000044
(0.00)

Industry

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

CSA-Community (COM))

(2)

(3)

2.75*
(1.12)

CEO power

3.13*
(1.30)
0.028
(0.03)

-1.26*
(0.63)

CSA-COM*CEO power

_cons

0.039
(0.16)
N
153
Chi-squared
20.8
Standard errors in parentheses
+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

0.62*
(0.29)

0.44
(0.76)
153
11.8

0.11
(0.17)
153
21.7

0.84
(0.79)
153
12.8
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FIGURE 2.1
Graphical Depiction of Interaction between CEO Power with Community Social
Activism
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6. CHAPTER 2 APPENDICES
Background Information on KLD Dimensions & Variables
Data Collection Process: This KLD data is collected by Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI) indexes. MSCI ESG Research employs a global team of over 140
experienced research
analysts to assess how well companies manage their ESG risks and opportunities.
In order too assess Firms’ exposure to and management of ESG risks and opportunities,
MSCI ESG Research collects data from the following sources: i) Macro data at segment
or geographic level from academic, government, NGO datasets ii) Company disclosure
(10-K, sustainability report, proxy report, AGM results, etc.) iii) Government databases,
1600+ media, NGO, other stakeholder sources. Firms surveyed are invited to participate
in a formal data verification process each year. S&P 1500 firms reside in the KLD
database, all of which are based in the United States.

Dimensions
Environment
Employee
Human rights
Community
Corporate governance
Diversity
Product

APPENDIX A. KLD DIMENSIONS
Number of strength items Number of concern items
8
7
7
5
4
7
8
5
5
6
8
3
4
4
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APPENDIX B. KLD VARIABLES
Name
ALC_con_A
ALC_con_num
ALC_con_X
CGOV_con_B
CGOV_con_F
CGOV_con_G
CGOV_con_H
CGOV_con_I
CGOV_con_J
CGOV_con_K
CGOV_con_L
CGOV_con_M
CGOV_con_num
CGOV_con_X
CGOV_str_A
CGOV_str_C
CGOV_str_D
CGOV_str_E
CGOV_str_F
CGOV_str_G
CGOV_str_H
CGOV_str_num
CGOV_str_X
Com_con_A
COM_con_B
COM_con_D
COM_con_num
COM_con_X
COM_str_A
COM_str_B
COM_str_C
COM_str_D
COM_str_F
COM_str_G
COM_str_H
COM_str_num
COM_str_X
DIV_con_A
DIV_con_B
DIV_con_C
DIV_con_D
DIV_con_num
DIV_con_X
DIV_str_A
DIV_str_B
DIV_str_C
DIV_str_D
DIV_str_E
DIV_str_F
DIV_str_G
DIV_str_H
DIV_str_num

Description
Alcohol Involvement
Alcohol - Number of Concerns
Alcohol Other Concern (through 2002)
High Compensation
Ownsership Concern
Accounting Concern (from 2005)
Transparency Concern (2005-2012)
Political Accountability Concern (from 2005)
Public Policy Concern (from 2007 through 2011)
Governance Structures Controversies
Controversial Investments
Business Ethics
Corp. Gov - Number of Concerns
Corp. Gov Other Concerns
Limited Compensation
Ownership Strength
Transparency Strength (1996-2012)
Political Accountability Strength (from 2005)
Public Policy Strength (from 2007 through 2011)
Corruption & Political Instability
Financial System Instability
Corp. Gov - Number of Strengths
Corp. Gov Other Strength
Investment Controversies
Negative Economic Impact
Tax Disputes
Community - Number of Concerns
Community Other Concerns
Charitable Giving (from 1991 through 2011)
Innovative Giving
Support for Housing
Support for Education (from 1994)
Non-US Charitable Giving
Volunteer Programs (from 2005)
Notabel community engagement programs
Community - Number of Strengths
Other Strengths (from 1991 through 2011)
Controversies
Non-Representation (from 1993 through 2011)
Board Diversity
Board of Directors - Minorities
Diversity - Number of Concerns
Diversity Other Concerns
CEO
Promotion (from 1991 through 2011)
Board of Directors
Work-Life Benefits (from 1991 through 2011)
Women and Minority Contracting
Employment of the Disabled
Gay and Lesbian Policies (from 1995 through 2011)
Firm’s efforts to promote diversity
Diversity - Number of Strengths
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DIV_str_X
EMP_con_A
EMP_con_B
EMP_con_C
EMP_con_D
EMP_con_F
EMP_con_G
EMP_con_H
EMP_con_num
EMP_con_X
EMP_str_A
EMP_str_B
EMP_str_C
EMP_str_D
EMP_str_F
EMP_str_G
EMP_str_H
EMP_str_I
EMP_str_J
EMP_str_K
EMP_str_L
EMP_str_M
EMP_str_N
EMP_str_num
EMP_str_X
ENV_con_A
ENV_con_B
ENV_con_C
ENV_con_D
ENV_con_E
ENV_con_F
ENV_con_G
ENV_con_H
ENV_con_I
ENV_con_J
ENV_con_K
ENV_con_num
ENV_con_X
ENV_str_A
ENV_str_B
ENV_str_C
ENV_str_D
ENV_str_F
ENV_str_G
ENV_str_H
ENV_str_I
ENV_str_J
ENV_str_K
ENV_str_L
ENV_str_M
ENV_str_N
ENV_str_num
ENV_str_O
ENV_str_P
ENV_str_Q
ENV_str_X

Diversity Other Strength
Union Relations
Health and Safety Concern
Workforce Reductions
Retirement Benefits Concern
Supply Chain Controversies
Child Labor
EMP-con-H
Emp. Relations - Number of Concerns
Emp. Relations Other Concerns
Union Relations
No-Layoff Policy (through 1994)
Cash Profit Sharing
Employee Involvement
Retirement Benefits Strength
Health and Safety Strength
Supply Chain Policies, Programs & Initiatives
Compensation and Benefits
Employee Relations
Professtion Development
Human Capital Development
Labor Management
Waste Management - Electronic Waste
Emp. Relations - Number of Strengths
Employee Strengths - Other Strengths (from 1991 through 2011, From 2013)
Hazardous Waste
Regulatory Problems
Ozone Depleting Chemicals
Substantial Emissions
Agriculture Chemicals
Climate Change (from 1999)
Negative Impact of Products and Services
Land Use & Biodiversity
Non Carbon Releases
Supply Chain Management
Water Management
Environment - Number of Concerns
Environment Other Concerns
Beneficial Products and Services
Pollution Prevention
Recycling
Clean Energy
Property, Plant, Equipment (through 1995)
Management Systems Strength
Natural Capital = Water Stress
Natural Capital - Biodiversity & Land Use
Natural Capital - Raw Material Sourcing
Climate Change - Financing Environmental Impact
Environmental Opportunities = Oppertunities in Green Building
Environmental Opportunities - Opportunities in Renewable Energy
Polution & Waste - Electonic Waste
Environment - Number of Strengths
Climate Change - Energy Efficiency
Climate Change - Product Carbon Footprint
Climate Change - Climate Change Vulnerability
Environment Other Strength
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FIR_con_A
GAM_con_A
GAM_con_num
GAM_con_X
HUM_con_A
HUM_con_B
HUM_con_C
HUM_con_D
HUM_con_F
HUM_con_G
HUM_con_H
HUM_con_J
HUM_con_K
HUM_con_num
HUM_con_X
HUM_str_A
HUM_str_D
HUM_str_G
HUM_str_num
HUM_str_X
MIL_con_A
MIL_con_B
MIL_con_C
MIL_con_num
MIL_con_X
NUC_con_A
NUC_con_C
NUC_con_D
NUC_con_num
NUC_con_X
PRO_con_A
PRO_con_D
PRO_con_E
PRO_con_F
PRO_con_G
PRO_con_num
PRO_con_X
PRO_str_A
PRO_str_B
PRO_str_C
PRO_str_D
PRO_str_E
PRO_str_F
PRO_str_G
PRO_str_H
PRO_str_I
PRO_str_J
PRO_str_K
PRO_str_num
PRO_str_X
TOB_con_A
TOB_con_num
TOB_con_X

Firearms Involvement (from 1999)
Gambling Involvement
Gambling - Number of Concerns
Gambling Other Concern (through 2002)
South Africa (1991-1994)
Northern Ireland (1991-1994)
Burma Concern (from 1995)
Mexico (1995-2002)
Labor Rights Concern (from 1998)
Indigenous Peoples Relations Concern (from 2000)
The company has operations or direct investment
in, or sourcing from, Sudan
Freedom of Expression & Censorship
Human Rights Violations
Human Rights - Number of Concerns
Human Rights Other Concerns
Positive Record in S. Africa (1994-1995)
Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength (from 2000)
Labor Rights Strength (from 2002)
Human Rights - Number of Strengths
Human Rights Other Strength
Military Involvement
Minor Weapons Contracting (1991-2002)
Major Weapons-related Supplier (1991-2002)
Military - Number of Concerns
Military Other Concern (through 2002)
Nuclear Involvement
Nuclear Design (through 2002)
Nuclear Fuel Cycle (through 2002)
Nuclear - Number of Concerns
Nuclear Other Concern (through 2002)
Product Safety
Marketing-Contracting Concern
Antitrust
Customer Relations
PRO-con-G
Product - Number of Concerns
Product Other Concerns
Quality
R+D-Innovation
Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged
Social Opportunities - Access to Finance
Social Opportunities - Access to Communications
Social Opportunities - Opportunities in Nutrition and Health
Product Safety - Chemical Safety
Product Safety - Financial Product Safety
Product Safety - Privacy & data Security
Product Safety - Responsible Investment
Product Safety - Insuring Health and Demographic Risk
Product - Number of Strengths
Product Other Strengths
Tobacco Involvement
Tobacco - Number of Concerns
Tobacco Other Concern (through 2002)
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